Although justice is a common precondition in Islamic jurisprudence with wide legal and religious applications, there is major disagreement over its meaning and verification. According to the prevailing view among Imāmī jurists, justice requires complete adherence to all obligations and avoidance of all prohibitions; anyone failing to do so loses the status of justice and may not undertake roles conditioned by it.

Using a descriptive–analytical method and library sources, this study examines justice in contexts such as enjoining good and forbidding wrong, testimony, polygamy, public-interest duties (umūr ḥisbah), ḥadīth narration, governance, judiciary, and congregational leadership. It aims to determine, through textual evidence, how justice can be defined as a case-dependent concept for greater practical effectiveness.

Findings show that the requirement of justice functions as a rational mechanism for trust-building, not necessarily identical with total moral perfection. The degree of justice varies with the level of trust required in each role. In areas such as narration, testimony, and public duties, relative position-based justice suffices, while in judging or governance, absolute justice is necessary. Thus, justice sustains one essence but differs in application, depending on which obligations or prohibitions influence trust in each context.