The Invalidity of Probable Opinion in Islamic Jurisprudence: A Critical Analysis of Shiite Scholars’ Epistemic Position in Interpreting the Relevant Verses of the Qurʾān

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Jurisprudence and Islamic Law, Faculty of Humanities, University of Semnan, Semnan, Iran

2 Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

3 Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

Many Shiite Jurists believe that the general epistemic principle expressing that in deriving Islamic Law “probable opinions are invalid unless proven otherwise” can be supported by some verses of the Qurʾān. However, by taking this position they have to face with many challenges, including the challenge of how to justify the exception of some particular sources of probable opinion form this general principle, such as the opinions based on isolated narrations and linguistic evidence from the Qurʾān and the tradition of the infallibles. The main purpose of this article is to show that the endeavor of this group of jurists to find support for this principle from the Qurʾān is based on their misinterpretation of the verses to which they appeal, and that what is forbidden in these verses is not probable opinion as such, but some non-reliable types of belief-forming process, such as unwarranted guessing, wishful thinking, etc. The article will end up with the conclusion that this epistemic principle is unacceptable and that probable opinions should be divided into valid and invalid based on their epistemic reliability or non-reliability of the belief-forming process through which they are generated.

Keywords

Religious Researches

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 01 July 2020

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History

  • Receive Date: 14 June 2020
  • Revise Date: 01 July 2020
  • Accept Date: 01 July 2020

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