Inefficiency of Famous Theory In Justifying Suspension of General Ruling about Implicit Meaning of Condition

"Implicit meaning of condition" – i.e. nullification of legal ruling present in a conditional statement in case of disappearance of condition – is one of the topics discussed in 'Elm-e-Usul-e-Fiqh (Science of principles of jurisprudence). For proving the implicit meaning of the condition, it is necessary that if subject of the ruling disappears, the general ruling present in the conditional statement should be nullified rather than individual ruling. However, nullification of the general ruling in the statements in which the ruling is concluded from structure (of the sentence) confronts a serious problem. Because, according to the famous theory, a ruling concluded from the structure has a minor meaning or in other words is the individual ruling. Therefore, what conditional statement consists of is the individual ruling, whereas proving the implicit meaning relies on disappearance of the general ruling. Majority of scholars of 'Elm-e-Usul-e-Fiqh try to reply to this objection by proving the suspension of the general ruling (on the condition). Due to basic difference, they have presented different arguments that most of them are objectionable and invalid. As mostly the subject of the legal statements is general, therefore the famous theory regarding position of the structures confronts another important objection, i.e. disproportion between a general subject and individual ruling. So if we assume that the subject is general, necessarily the general ruling should apply on it so that it may cover all the occurrences and circumstances of the subject. It is not rational that an individual ruling may apply on a general subject. Therefore, by preserving the famous theory about (lexical) structures, there is no way to avoid the said objection and prove the implicit meaning of the condition.